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ABSTRACT
The implications for the effectiveness of monetary, fiscal and financial
policy of the "rational expectations revolution" are evaluated. The general
conclusion is that to anticipate policy is not to neutralize it. This is
obviously the case for structural policies that alter the level and composition
of full employment output. It also holds for stabilization policies that in-
fluence deviations of real variables from their "natural" values. Substitution
of bond financing for tax financing of a given real spending program reduces
saving and lowers the capital-labor ratio, even when allowance is made for
private intergenerational gifts. Anticipated monetary policy affects the
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Summary
The paper evaluates the implications for the conduct of monetary, fiscal
and financial policy of the "rational expectations revolution" in macroeconomics.
The general conclusion is that most of the policy conclusions derived from
conventional eclectic Neo-Keynesian models remain valid when rational expectations
are introduced: to anticipate policy is not to neutralize it. Both structural
policies aimed at altering the level and composition of full employment output
in the short run and in the long run and stabilization policies aimed at
influencing the cyclical departures of output and employment from their full
employment levels are considered.
The consequences of structural fiscal policy--changes in non-lump-sum tax
rates and in public spending--for full employment output and e~ployment are
non-controversial. The confirmation of familiar Neo-Keynesian results about
financial and monetary policy may be more surprising. Here the I'lajor policy
conclusions are the following:
1) ~~_!!~~~~!~~_~!_~~~~~~~~!_~E~~~!~~.For a given level and composition
of real government spending on goods and services, the substitution of bond
financing for current (lump-sum) taxes reduces saving in the short run and
lowers the capital-labor ratio in the long run. This crowding out result
persists even if each economic agent allows fully for the future taxes
"required" to service the stocy: of privately held interest-bearing public
debt. It even holds when allowance is made for the possibility of bequ~sts
and other private intergenerational gifts. In a situation of Keynesian
unemployment the crowding out of saving in the short run may be an appropriate
policy to achieve a higher degree of resource utilization. The substitution
of money financing for tax financing is also not a matter of indifference.
The "inflation tax" is not equivalent to explicit current taxes. In the
simple models considered in the paper, the substitution of money financing
for tax financing "crowds in" saving and raises the capital-labor ratio in
the long run.-2-
2) ~~~~!~E¥_E~!!~~_~~~_~!~~!!!~~!!~~'Anticipated. as well as unanticipated
monetary policy will affect the cyclical behavior of re~al economic variables.
To obtain the result that anticipated monetary policy aeoes not matter for the
behavior of real output, employment etc., it is necessa=ry to assume that all
prices always and instantaneously assume their competit~ivemarket-clearing values,
in addition to having rational expectations based on th~e same information as is
available to the monetary authorities. Even then antici~patedmonetary policy will
not be neutral unless thellstructural" channel through WI-L-hich monetary policy can
operate is also assumed to be ineffective. This structu~al channel is the effect
of changes in the money supply process on the anticipat~ed rate of inflation and
thus on the rate of return to holding money balances an~d other nominal financial
claims. Anticipated monetary policy therefore affects r~ealvariables through
three channels.l) Sticky nominal prices. 2) Non-identic=al information available
to the public and private sectors. 3) The effect of mon~etary growth on inflation
and thus on the portfolio choice between real and nomin=al assets.
There are no grounds, in view of these conclusions~, for believing that
constraining the conduct of fiscal, monetary and financ=ial policy by very simple,
inflexible rules such as a constant growth rate for the~ money supply, a balanced
budget or a constant share of public spending in GNP ~vi~l be optimal or even
sensible.Wi11em H. Buiter
September 1979
The Roles of Monetary) Financial· and
Fiscal Po1icyurtdet Rational Expectations
T. Irttroduc~ion
Neo~eynesian accounts of the roles of monetary, financia1,and fiscal
policy have recently been challenged by a revival of classical macroeconomic
thinking--an approach to theory and policy that many had considered forever
buried under the economic ruins of the Great Depression. This New Classical
Macroeconomics is associated originally with Milton Friedman (1968) and more
recently with Phelps (1970), Lucas (1972a, b, 1975, 1976) Sargent and
Wallace (1975, 1976) Barro (1974, 1976,1979), and a host of others. The
main implications of this approach for macroeconomic policy can be summa-
rized in two"rieutra1ity or worselt propositions.
Deterministic (and known) monetary policy rules can have no effect
on the joint probability distribution functions of real economic variab1es--
neutrality--but stochastic monetary policy behavior can increase the vari-
ability of real variables relative to their full information va1ues--or
worse. This proposition has at times been extended to encompass not only
monetary policy but stabilization policy in general. (McCallum, 1977.)
Debt neutrality: the full real impact of the government sector is
measured by the magnitude and composition of its real spend~~g_ program.
The financing mode chosen, current taxes, borrowing or currency creation,
is of no consequence. This proposition, first analyzed by Ricardo, has
recently been restated by Barro (1974).
In a recent paper, "The Macroeconomics of Dr. Pang1oss" (Buiter, 1980
forthcoming), I have presented a nontechnical survey of the two theoretical- 2 -
cornerstones of the New Classical Macroeconomics. These are rational
expectations in the sense of Muth and what I have called the "surprise"
supply function--the proposition that only unanticipated policy changes
(or other unanticipated, exogenous disturbances) can cause the real
economic system to depart from an otherwise policy-invariant equilibrium
trajectory. In this paper I shall say nothing further about the rational
expectations assumption. It, or its deterministic counterpart, perfect
foresight, will be incorporated in every model considered below. My
purpose is to provide a more formal statement of the propositions
advanced in my "Pangloss" paper concerning the scope for monetary policy,
debt management policy, and fiscal policy under rational expectations.
The setup is as follows. Section II presents a fairly standard, small
deterministic macromodel with a number of classical features. All markets
clear instantaneously, there is no money illusion and perfect foresight
rules. The effects of monetary, financial, and fiscal policy in this
model are analyzed. A number of non-neutrality propositions are stated.
The drawback of this model is that it is ad hoc in the sense that private
behavioral relationships have not been derived from explicit optimizing
behavior. Section III therefore studies debt neutrality and monetary super-
neutrality in a "fully rational" overlapping generations model. This leads
to the conclusion that the ad hoc model of Section II is not a bad parable
for such fully rational models. Section IV abandons the assumption of
universal instantaneous Walrasian equilibrium and considers the consequences
of price arid wage stickiness. for the scope for ·stabilization policy; -
stochastic models are analyzed here, which also permits the consideration
of some of the interesting issues associated with incomplete information..~ 3 -
There are two major limitations on the scope of this critique of the
New Classical Macroeconomics: it is mainly theoretical and it is limited
to models of a closed econOmy.
II. Monetary, Financial, and Fiscal Policy
in an Ad Hoc Equilibrium Model with
Rational Expectations··
Desctiptionofthe model
The model represented in equations (1) through (17) is the full
employment version of the textbook closed economy IS-1M model. The
nominal interest rate, the price level and the money wage rate always
instantaneously assume the values required to equilibrate the asset












K stock of capital
N employment
L demand for real money balances
M nominal stock of money
B nominal value of the stock of government bonds
A private non-human wealth
D real government deficit
T real taxes net of transfers, excluding debt service
p price of output
q price of installed capital in terms of current output
W money wage
R nominal interest rate
rK required real rate of return on capital
~ proportional tax on interest income
t proportional tax on profits
~
t proportional tax on capital gains c
t proportional tax on labor income w
t proportional payroll tax on employers e
L lump-sum tax on households
xP expected rate of inflation
xq expected proportional rated change of q
o fraction of the public sector deficit financed by borrowing- S -
a fraction of private holdings of public sector interest-bearing debt
perceived as net worth by the private sector
fraction of public spending perceived as real private income-in-
kind















r = R(l - t ) - xP
K R
L = L(R(l - t R), Y, A), L1 ~ 0; L2 > 0; 0 < L3
< 1
RB G P (M + aB] Y = f (K, N) + P - T - (1 - a)(l - cS)D + BC - x l p
(11.10) D = CG + RB - T
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- 6 ~
The steady-state equilibrium of the model is obtained by setting
~K = ~(M) = ~(~) = o. Thus 11.16, II.l7a and 11.176 are replaced by
p P
(11.18) q = 1, i.e. r
K
= fK(K, N) (1 - t~)
(II.19a)
(l1.l9b)
oD = QE. !!
p p
(l - o)D = ~ ~
p p
Equation 11.1 is the IS equation equating effective demand for output
to full employment production. l/ Full employment production is given by
a linear homogenous production function, f, in capital and labor with
positive and diminishing marginal products. Equation 11.2 is the LM or
portfolio balance equation. Private consumption depends on the real
interest rate, real income and real private net worth. It also may depend
directly on government consumption. ~/ This will be the case, e.g., if
government consumption is a substitute for private consumption (free school
milk, etc.). Private capital formation is an increasing function of the
price of installed capital goods relative to the cost of producing new
investment goods. The current price of capital equals the discounted value
of current after-tax cash flow plus next period's expected price of s-apital
(equation 11.5). Due aliowance has to be made for profits taxes (at rate
t ) and capital gains taxation (at rate t). The required rate of return
TI c
on capital, rK, equals the real rate of return on bonds (equation 11.6), a
reflection of the Keynesian assumption that bonds and claims on existing
capital are perfect substitutes in private portfolios. Interest income istaxed at a rate t R• Inflationary capital gains or losses on money and bonds are
not taxed. The demand for money depends on the real after-tax rate of return
differential between bonds-cum-capita1 and money, on real income and real non-
human wealth. Real income, equation 11.8, consists of disposable private
RB income, f + ~ - T, adjusted in a number of ways. First, expected capital
p
gains (or losses) due to expected inflation and expected changes in q are
added (-xp (~, + ex~) + xqqK). Then we allow for the fact that a fraction
p
1 - ex of the stock of government bonds held by the private sector may
not be viewed as private net worth because they are offset by the present
value of the future taxes "required" to service this debt. The "flow"
counterpart of this wealth adjustment is the subtraction of a fraction
1 ~ ex of the bond-financed part of the government deficit in 11.8. That
part of the deficit is viewed as equivalent to current taxes. Finally,
if government spending on real goods and services is perceived as income-
in-kind, this has to be added in. Equation II.9.defines total taxes in
terms of its constituent components. Equation 11.10 is the public sector
deficit. Real non-human wealth, in equation 11.11, includes the adjustment
for bonds discussed earlier. Equations 11.12 and 11.13 give the real
demand price and real supply price of labor, respectively. The demand
price equals the marginal product of labor net of payroll taxes. Labor
supply depends on the real interest rate, real net worth and goverrtment
spending. Labor market equilibrium is assumed in equation 11.14.
Equations II.15a and II.15b impose rational expectations for the general
price level and the price of capital. Equations 11.16, I1.17a and IL17b
are the dynamic equations describing the behavior over time of the capital
stock, 2J of the stock of real money balances and of the real stock of
bonds.- 8 -
Effects of 'structural' fiscal artdtilortetary policy
Fiscal and monetary policy will have important effects in this equilibrium
model. The level and composition of real full employment output can be influenced
in the short run (identified with the unit period of analysis), in the long
run (the steady-state equilibrium) and in the real-time intermediate run in
which policy decisions are actually made. These real output effects are not
due to the elimination of involuntary Keynesian excess supply but to policy-
induced changes in important relative prices. This alters the labor-leisure
trade-off, the intertemporal consumption trade-off, the marginal cost of
labor, etc. Standard comparative statics yield the following policy
conclusions:
a. Taxation. The non lump-sum tax changes are constant revenue changes with
T adjusting endogenously. Consider the special case of the labor supply function
where it is independent of the real interest rate and of net worth. If the
labor supply schedule is upward-sloping, an increase in the tax rate on
labor income, t , will shift it to the left, reducing full employment output
w
and employment for a given stock of capital. An increase in the payroll
tax, or in employers· national insurance contributions, t , reduces employ- . e
ment and output by shifting the labor demand schedule to the left, for a
given stock of capital. An increase in t , the profit tax, will affect--
1T
presumably lower--the rate of private capital formation in the short run
and the steady-state capital-labor ratio in the long run. An increase in
capital gains taxation, t , will have similar effects in the short run. In
c
steady-state equilibrium there are no real capital gains so changes in
capital gains taxation will not affect the long-run real equilibrium. An
increase in the tax rate on interest income, t R, will lower the required
rate of return on capital. This will tend to stimulate capital formation
in the short run and raise the capital-labor ratio in the long run. An- 9 -
increase in lump-sum taxes, L, will reduce real income unless, 'given the
government's real spending program, money- and bond-financed deficits are
exactly equivalent to explicit lump-sum taxation. For this to be the
case, i~ is necessary that government bonds do not constitute net private
sector wealth to any extent, i.e., that a o. With exclusively bond-
financed deficits, 0 = 0, the appropriate real income concept then becomes,
using II.8
(11.8') Y = f(K, N) + (13 -1) C
G -~~+~qK
A substitution of lump-sum tax financing for borrowing will have no real
effects. With money-financed deficits, 0 = 1, equation 11.8 can be
written as:
(II.8") Y = f(K, N) + (13 - l)C
G
+ b: - ~(~) + ~ qK
A once-and-for all increase in the level of the stock of money will be strictly
neutral in this model only if a = o. !i./
bM bn M This means that - - .=L. -
P P P
is zero when such a level shift in the money stock path occurs, and
that ~ is independent of such a level shift. Thus a one-period unexpected
q
shift from money financing to lump-sum tax financing will not have any
real effects.
b. Government spending. In this classical equilibrium model, changes
in government spending on real goods and services will have powerful short-
run and long-run effects. All tax rates are assumed constant. Any changes in
the public sector deficit or surplus are financed according to II.17a and
ILI7b. If there is no direct crowding out (Buiter, 1977, 1979), Le., if
government consumption is not a substitute or complement for private consumption
and leisure (Cl = 0, 13 = 0, h2 = 0), government spending will "crowd out"
private consumption and investment spending on a one-for-one basis by raising
the price level and the interest rate. ~/ In the long run, a higher level
of public spending is likely to "crowd out"..-.10 ....
real capital, although this need not be the case. If higher public spending
leads to steady state deficits, these could be associated with higher rates
of inflation. This would make real capital a more attractive asset compared
to money and creates the possibility of long..,..run "crowding in." Getting
rid of all real effects of government spending requires some very strong
assumptions. (i) No direct effect of public consumption on the supply of
labor: h2 = o. (ii) Public consumption is a perfect substitute for private
consumption and thus constitutes income in kind on a one-for-one basis:
C1 = -1 and B = 1. (iii) Debt neutrality prevails: a = o. (iv) If the
higher level of public spending is associated with increased deficits, these
either are financed by borrowing, or, to the extent that they are financed
by money creation, only involve a once-and-for all step increase in the
money supply. Since most of these assumptions are rather silly, the real
trajectory of the economy will certainly not be invariant under alternative
paths for real government spending.
c. Money neutrality. A once-and-for all step increase in the nominal
stock of money will be neutral, i.e., have no real effects only if a = 0:
debt neutrality prevails. A given percentage change in M, if it
were associated with an equal percentage change in p and W, would reduce
the real value of a given nominal stock of bonds. This will only fail to
have real consequences if bonds do not matter, i.e., if a = o. Debt
neutrality is discussed at length in Section III.
d. Monetary superneutrality. This is the property that the real
trajectory of the economic system is invariant under alternative proportional
rates of growth of the nominal money supply. It is easily seen that if
monetary
B f 0, debt neutrality is a necessary condition for/superneutrality. As can beseen from equations II.19a and II.19b, only a common proportional rate of
growth. of the nominal stocks of money and bonds is consistent with steady
state equilibrium if a f o. Even if debt neutrality prevails, super-
neutrality will be negated by the fact that no market-determined interest
rate is paid on money balances. The real rate of return on money is minus
the expected rate of inf1ation~ Higher proportional rates of money growth
are, across steady states, associated with higher proportional rates of
inflation. These lower' real returns from holding money will lead to a
portfolio shift from money to real capital, thus destroying superneutrality,
unless the demand for money is completely interest-inelastic. Any change
in fiscal parameters that changes the rate of inf1ation(because it leads
to changesin the growth path of the money supply)wil1 therefore have real
effects, even if it were to have no direct structural effects or displace-
ment effects. The next section considers debt neutrality and monetary
superneutrality in an utterly classical overlapping generations world.
III. Debt Neutrality and Monetary Superneutra1ity in
FullyOptimiiing Models
a.Debt neutrality in anoptimizingmacromode1
In two recent studies· (Buiter and Tobin,:'l980, Tobin and Buiter, 1980) ~
James Tobin and I concluded that debt neutra1ity--the property
trajectory of the economic system is invariant under changes in
the real
inancing
mix, for a given level and composition of real government spending--is a
theoretical curiosum. The assumptions required for it to be valid can easily
be shown to be contradicted by practical experience. In this section of the
paper, I shall restate the case against debt neutrality in the context of a
model constructed expressly to be as favorable as possible to classical- 12 -
invariance theorems. The model is a generalization of Diamond's over-
lapping generations model (Diamond, 1965), and allows for voluntary inter-
generational gifts and bequests. (See Barro, 1974, and Buiter; 1980a).
A comprehensive treatment of the subject can be found in Carmichael (1979).
Except for some minor changes, the treatment of the case of agents with
"two-sided intergenerational caring" replicates the original work of
Carmichael.
The overlapping generations model used to develop the non-neutrality
theories is "classical" in the sense that private actions are derived
from explicit optimizing behavior, perfect foresight prevails and all
markets are in equilibrium all of the time. All private agents act as
price takers. I shall study the behavior of this decentralized, com-
c
petitive economy when a given government opending program is financ~d
by different combinations of lump-sum taxation or current borrowing. With-
out loss of generality the level of government spending is assumed to equal
zero, which allows us to rephrase the argument in terms of the real effects
of alternative debt issue-taxation programs. The restriction to lump-sum
taxes is necessary to give the neutrality proposition a chance. Non-lump-
sum taxes on labor income, profits, wealth or any other base, will introduce
·stortions, impose excess burdens and, except in uninteresting special
ave real effects.~rivate, voluntary intergenerational gifts--from
parents to children (bequests) or from children to parents--are essential
for the debt neutrality property to prevail. Briefly, the argument for
neutrality goes as follows. The stock of real government interest-bearing
debt has no effect on private behavior because correspo~ding to every
dollar's worth of income on these bonds is a dollar's worth of tax payments- 13 -
to finance the bond income. The value of the government bonds on the
asset side of private portfolios is the present discounted value of these
future income payments. The value of these bonds is therefore exactly
matched by the present discounted value of the future tax payments
required to service them. Even if we grant that the future payments stream
and the future tax payments stream are identical and that both are dis-
counted in the same manner? a shift from tax financing to borrowing could
cause non-neutrality because of an intergenerational redistribution of
resources. If the bonds are one-period bonds and each individual is
supposed to live for two periods, the intergenerational redistribution that can
be associated with such issues is iffiQediately apparent. Let an extra Pound's
worth of bonds be issued in period t. It is bought by the then young
members of generation t. Next period interest and repayment of principal
occur. The tax revenue required for the debt servicing could be levied on the
then young members of 3eneration t + 1. In that case, real resources have been
redistributed from the young to the old. Consumption and capital formation
will be affected. An unfunded social security program will have broadly
similar effects. Longer maturity bonds can be incorporated in the analysis
without materially altering it. Voluntary intergenerational gifts can
remove the real consequences of involuntary intergenerational redistribution
through the borrowing-taxation mechanism. Provided the taxes are lump-sum,
such private intergenerational transfers will restore the original con-
sumption-investment equilibrium as long as such private actions do not violate the
non-negativity constraints on these voluntary intergenerational transfers. If,
before the extra Pound's worth of public debt is issued the members of the older
generation were all leaving positive bequests to their descendants? the- 14 -
option of redistributing resources from the young to the old through a
cut in bequests was already open to the older generation. Their decision
not to exercise this option reflects that, at the margin, they receive
greater utility from the well-being of their heirs than from their own
consumption. The government's attempt to redistribute "gross resources"
from the young to the old will in that case by met by increased bequests
from the old to the young, leaving the "net resources" available to each
generation unchanged. If, on the other hand, the older generations were
initially at a "zero bequest corner," -i.e., if in order to increase their
own life-time resources they would gladly have left their children a
negative legacy, had this not been ruled out by law, the involuntary
intergenerational redistribution would not have been neutralized by an
exactly matching voluntary transfer in the opposite direction.
Within the bounds set by the non-negativity constraints on gifts and
bequests, lump-sum redistribution through borrowing or unfunded social
security schemes will be neutralized by voluntary intergenerational
transfers, if bequest or gift motives are present. Private non-market
transactions are required to neutralize public non-market transactions.
A formal analysis follows below.
Notation
consumption while young by a member of generation t
consumption while old by a member of generation t
capital stock in existence at the beginning of period t
size of generation t
saving by a member of generation t while old (i.e., his bequest
to young members of generation t + 1)- 15 -
gift by a young member of generation t to old members of
generation t - 1.
stock of real one-period government debt in existence at the
beginning of period t




r t interest rate on savings carried from period t - 1 into period t
n one-period proportional rate of growth of population
o one-period discount rate applied to the utility of one's
immediate descendant
p one-period discount rate applied to the utility of one's
immediate forebear
b. Government financing in an overlapping generations model without
gifts or bequests
Each generation'consists of identical households that live for two
periods. During the first period of their lives each household works
a fixed amount, 1. Income earned in the first period is either consumed
or saved. These savings, plus accumulated interest, are the only source
of income in the second period of a household's life when it is retired.
Households are also identical across generations. Initially there is no
government borrowing or lending and no taxation. On the output side, the
model has a single commodity that can either be consumed or used as a
capital good. Until government bonds are introduced, real capital is the
only store of value. The model is "real": there are no money balances.
The dual role to be performed by durable output--that of being an input
in the production function and of being the only store of value may lead
to inefficiencies in a decentralized, competitive economy. (See Diamond,
1965; Buiter,1980a; and Carmichael, 1979.)- 16 -
c. A competitive economy without government debt
In the absence of government borrowing and lending, the utility
maximization program faced by a representative household of generation
t is given by:





(III. 1) 1 + ci:
ct 1 + r ~ wt
t + 1
Equation 111.1 states that the present discounted value of life-
time consumption cannot exceed that of labor income. Given our
assumptions about the utility function, u, the budget constraint will
hold with equality and all solutions for c~ and c~ will be interior.
Utility is a function of own lifetime consumption only. There is no
gift or bequest motive. The model is completed by adding the economy-
wide constraints, 111.2, 111.3, and 111.4.
(III.2) wt






(III.4) wt - c = k + 1(1 + n) t t
Output is produced by a well-behaved neoclassical production function
which is linear homogenous in capital and labor. In intensive form it can
be written as: f(kt ) with f (0) = 0; f '> 0; f "< o. 1J Equation 111.2
states that the labor market clears and is competitive. The real wage- 17 -
equals the marginal product of labor. Equation 111.3 states that the
capital rental market clears and is competitive with the rental rate
(which in the one-commodity model also equals the interest rate)
equal to the marginal product of capital. Equation 111.4 is the economy-
wide capital market equilibrium condition. The stock of capital in
existence at the beginning of period t, Kt , is equal to the savings of
the previous period. Only the young save in this model without bequests,
so saving in t - 1 is given by (wt _ 1 - c~ _ 1) Lt _ 1. Our conditions
on the production function imply kt
> o.
The interior first-order condition for an optimum is:
(III.5)
Its interpretation in terms of a tangency between an indifference curve
1 2 in ct ' ct space and the intertemporal budget constraint is familiar. From
the first-order condition and the budget constraint, III. 1, we can solve
for 1 (and c2) as. a function of and Substituting the solution ct wt r t + 1· t
for 1 into the capital market equilibrium condition III.4 and using III. 2 ct
and 111.3 to substitute for wt and r t + l·we obtain a first-order difference
< 1, i.e., when librium i.f.f.
equation in k
t
describing the evolution over time of this economy from any
arbitrary set of initial conditions. ~/
(III.6) f(kt ) - ktf' (kt ) - c
1
(f(kt ) - ktf' (kt), f' (kt + 1)) = kt + 1(l + n)






1 + n + !£. f"
Clr
< 1,= f (k) - kf' (k)
o < a < 1, W'
- 18 -
In what follows we shall aSsume existence, uniqueness and stability and
proceed to analyze steady-state equilibria only.
In steady-state equilibrium, the capital-labor ratio anq through
that all real stock-stock and stock-flow ratios are constant. We solve
for it by setting kt = kt + 1 in equations 111.1 through 111.5. By sub-
stituting the marginal productivity conditions 111.2 and 111.3 into 111.1
and 111.4 we obtain equations 111.7 and 111.8, the stationary private
budget constraint and aggregate capital market equilibrium condition.
2 c
1 + f'(k)
(111.8) f(k) - kf'(k) - c1 = k(1 + n)
From 111.7 and 111.8 we can solve for the stationary decentralized con-
sumption possibility locus, as in III.9a and III.9b.
(III.9a) c2 w(c1)
(III.9b) ~.• - -(1 + f') [1 + k(~ ~ ;:)f"(1 + n + kf")-~
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, with f(k) = ka
= (1 + n) (1 + a2k(a - 1»
(1 - a)ak(a - 1) - (1 + n)
The stationary decentralized consumption possibility locus for the
Cobb-Douglas case is graphed in Figure 1. At the origin its slope is
a -1--- (1 + n). k increases monotonically as we move up from 0 towards A.
- a
As k approaches infinity (which would be beyond A in";the infeasible
region) the slope of the consumption possibility locus becomes -1. The








slope: -(1 + f'(k»
1 c..,. 19 -
constant returns production functions than the Cobb-Douglas,




Douglas this is not possible. At the golden rule capital-labor ratio,
Z
when f'(k) = n, 1/J' = -~ = ...(1 + f') = -(1 + n).
dc1
The steady-state equilibrium of a decentralized competitive economy
could be achieved anywhere on this locus. Steady-state equilibria like E
3
,
corresponding to a capital-labor ratio below the golden rule capital-labor
ratio k*, defined b~ f'(k*) = ~are possible as are those like EZ corres-
ponding to a capital-labor ratio in excess of k*. The golden rule capital-
labor ratio k* could be achieved by a competitive equilibrium at E
1
, but
this is not more likely than any other point on the locus. A competitive
stationary equilibrium satisfies two criteria: it lies on the stationary
consumption possibility locus and it has a tangency between an indifference
curve and a private budget constraint with slope -(1 + r) = -(1 + f'(k»).
The private budget constraint will always cut the stationary consumption
possibility locus in the manner indicated at E
3
and EZ• Only at the golden
rule (E ) will the private budget constraint be tangent to the locus.
I
It is instructive to contrast the private decentralized solution with
the solution achieved by an omnipotent social planner. The latter is only
subject to the aggregate resource constraint:
C~Lt + c~ _ 1Lt _ 1 = Ltf(kt ) - Lt(~t + 1(1 + n) ..,. k~ or
Z
1 + c t _ 1 c
t
1 + n
The stationary aggregate resource constraint is
(IlLl!) 1 cZ
c +l+n = f(k) - nk- 20 -
In order to maximize the stationary per capita amount of resources available
for consumption, the social planner selects the golden rule capital-labor
ratio k*. The stationary social consumption possibility locus is the
straight line yy with slope -(1 + n). By distribution through administrative
fiat, any point on this yy locus is available to the social planner. A
decentralized competitive equilibrium with a capital-labor ratio below k*,
as at E3,is not inefficient. During any transition from E
3
to E1, say,
capital deepening has to occur, requiring the sacrifice of consumption during
the transition in exchange for a permanently higher consumption path after
E1 has been achieved. A capital-labor ratio in excess of the golden rule is
inefficient because it is possible to reduce the capital-labor ratio and
thus to have a temporary consumption binge while enjoying a permanently
higher path of consumption after k* has been achieved. This inefficiency is
due to capital's dual role as a store of value and a factor of production.
In an attempt to shift consumption towards retirement, private agents save
by accumulating capital. This depresses the rate of interest. By making
available a store of value that has no additional intrinsic use, either as
a consumption good or a capital good, government borrowing can alleviate
and even eliminate any such inefficiency due to overaccumulation.
d. A competitive economy with government debt
Now consider the case in which the government issues real-valued one-
period bonds. Bonds floated during period t are repaid with interest at a
rate r t + 1 in period t + 1. Government bonds and real capital are perfect
substitutes in private sector portfolios. Dt can be negative, in which case
the public sector lends to the private sector. Such public sector lending
to the public sector consists of public purchases of private sector bonds(111.14)
- 21 ~
(which are also perfect substitutes for public bonds), not of real capital.
Tt is the total lump-sum tax bill paid by the younger generation in period t.
It can be negative in which case it constitutes transfer payments to the
young. With government debt and taxes the economy we are considering can
be represented as follows;




subject to ct ' ct
~ o.
1 2 (111.12) (wt - ct T
t
) (1 + r t + 1) ct
(111.13) (1 + r t ) Dt _ 1 = Dt + Tt
1
(wt - ct - Tt)Lt = Dt + Kt + 1
f'(kt + 1)
Equation 111.12 is the modified household budget constraint, allowing for
taxes while young. 111.13 is the government budget constraint. 111.14 is
the modified capital market equilibrium condition. Total saving has to be
equal to the total stock of assets consisting of government bonds and real
capital. Private life-cycle optimizing behavior yields a consumption
1 function ct
1 c2(.) ~ o.
1 We again assume 0 < c1(.) <1 andIII. 17'
- 22 -
The complete solution of the model is:
III. 15 cl cl(wt-'l"t' rt+l) t
III. 12 (Wt-C~-'l"t) (l+rt+l) = c2
t
III. 16 1 dt + kt+l(l+n) wt-Ct-'l"t
III. 17 (l+rt)dt_l=dt (l+n) + 'l"t(l+n)
III. 2 wt f(kt ) - kt f' (kt )
III. 3 rt+l f'(kt+l )
1 2 kt ~ 0 c t' ct '
At each point in time, t, this system of six equations determines the
values of c~, c~, wt ' kt+l and two of the three government instruments
'l"t' dt and rt+l' given the value assigned to the remaining government
instrument and the values of the predetermined variables rt , dt - l and
kt • I shall, through the rest of this section on debt neutrality, consider
the case in which dt , the per capita stock of real government debt is kept
at a constant value dt = d. In that case III. 17 simplifies to:
(rt - n)d
l+n









( 1 ) "( d cl -1 f k+ ~)
l+n+clfll
2
< 1- 23 -
Since k + d is non-negative (because c2 is non-negative), this
l+n
stability condition is qualitatively the same as that for the model
without government debt, given in 111.6).
The steady state equilibrium of the model with public debt is





cl (f(k)-kf' (k) - (f' i~-n)d, f'(k))
(f(k)-kf' (k) - (f' (k)-n)d 1 (l+f'(k)) 2
l+n - c ) = c




By substituting III. 20 into III. 22 we can derive the steady state






ak - = --,,-------------
ad (ci-l)f"(k+. l~)- [l+n+c~f"]
is stable (equation 111.19) and if
nator of III. 24 is negative. The denominator is positive. We therefore
obtain the familiar result that, comparing steady states, government debt
issues reduce the capital-labor ratio, i.e., crowd out real capital. This
"crowding out" result also obtains in the short run, as can be checked
from equation III. 18. Given kt , the effect on kt+l of an increase in d
is
III. 25 =
1 1 -1 (1+cln+(1-c1)f') (l+n)
-[l+n+clf"]
2ThO" ti 1"f cl 1S 1S nega ve 2 < O.
- 24 -
Note that the steady-state value of d can be chosen to be negative
or positive. Irrespective of d, if the economy is at the golden rule, no
net taxes or transfers are required (111.23). The growth in the total demand
for debt required to keep the per capita stock of debt constant
just suffices to repay the debt held by the old generation, plus interest
at the rate of population growth. Positive d requires positive T at
capital labor ratios below the golden rule ratio k* (at interest rates
above n), negative T in the inefficient region when f'(k) < n.
The steady-state effect of government debt issue can be illustrated
using a generalization of the stationary competitive
consumption possibility locus of Figure 1. The effect of an increase
in d on the stationary competitive consumption possibility locus is to
shift it up at a rate -(l+n). From III. 21 and 22 it is easily seen that,
at any given k, acl = _(l+f')
ad (l+n)
while ac2 = l+f' •
ad
Thus the rate at which,
for any given k, c2 is traded off for cl when d increases is -(l+n).
Figure 2 shows the general nature of the shift in the locus while Figure 3
focuses on a particular capital-labor ratio, k below the golden rule
ratio k*. A budget line with a common slope -(l+f'(k» passes through















Stationary competitive consumption possibility loci with low d




slope: -(1 + f' (k»
.....(..ll--~_--slope: ... (1 + n)
L c 1
Shift of the stationary competitive consumption possibility locus
when d increases, for a given capital-labor ratio k < k*.- 25 -
Bequests
With bequests, the utility function, the budget constraint and the
capital market equilibrium condition are altered. Bt is the bequest
left in the second period of his life by a member of generation t to
the members of generation t+l. The bequests are received by members of
generation t+l at the end of the first period of their lives. The value
of the bequest to members of generation t+l at the beginning of their
second period is Bt (l+rt+2)' When the rate of population growth is nonzero
bequests shared equally among all descendants. Note that bequests must
be non-negative, a useful institutional constraint.
111.26 Bt ~ 0 for all t.
The utility function of a member of generation t is W t = v (c~,c~,W*t+I)'
The utility of a member of generation t depends on his O,Tn life-time
consumption, c~' c~ and on the·::~~:i.inumutility level attainable by a member




u has all the properties attributed to the utility function of the house-
hold without a bequest motive. This ensures interior solutions for c~
and c~ and strict satisfaction of the household budget constraint. 6 is
the "generational" discount rate; it is not to be confused with the indivi-
dual's pure rate of time preference. Convergence, i.e., boundedness of W t
requires 6 > O. The optimization problem solved by a representative member
of generation t is given in equations 111~28 and 111.29. The new economy-
wide capital market equilibrium condition is given in equation 111.30.-26-
28 w* W 1 2 -1 * 1 2 III. max = max [u(ct'ct ) + (Ho) W+1]; c ,c ,B 2: O. t 1 2 t 1 2 t t t t
ct,ct,Bt ct,ct,Bt
subject to
III. 29 B <
Bt _l (l+rt+l ) 1 2
t l+n + (wt-Ct ) (l+rt+l ) - ct
1 Bt-l III. 30 wt - c +--= (l+n)kt+l • t l+n
The individual's budget constraint now contains the bequest he
receives and the bequest he leaves. The capital market equilibrium
conditivn recognizes that now both the young and the old generation can
The first order conditions for an optimum are:
III. 3la
III. 3lb
If Bt > 0, i.e., if there is an interior solution for bequests, III.3Ib
holds with equality. If there is a corner solution for bequests, i.e.,
if B = 0 is a binding constraint, III.3lb holds with strict inequality.
The interpretation of these first order conditions is straightforward.
III.3Ia says that the discounted marginal utility of consumption in the
second period of one's life should equal the marginal utility of consumption
in t!1e first period of one's life. III.3Ib states that if bequests are
positive, the marginal utility of own consumption should equal the marginal
utility of leaving a bequest. A marginal unit of income saved by an old
member of generation t yields resources (l+rt+2) times larger to generation
t+l. The marginal utility to a member of generation t of bequests can
be expressed as the discounted value of the marginal utility of consumption- 27 -
. ,
of a member of generation t+1. The appropriate discount rate is the
generational discount rate o. Finally, since it is the utility of a
representative member of generation t+1 that was assumed to enter into
the utility function of generation t, rather than the utility of all l+n
descendants, the population growth factor l+n also discounts the marginal
utility of consumption of generation t+1. If the marginal utility of own
consumption exceeds the marginal utility of bequests, there will be a
corner solution with B=O.
The steady state equilibrium of the model with bequests is given
in equations 111.32.
1 2 III.32a ul(c ,c ) 1 2 (1+r) u
2
(c , c )
III.32c
III.32d
IIL32b . (l+n) (1+1S) ~ l+r
if B > 0, (1+n)(1+0) = l+r
if B = 0 and the zero bequest constraint is binding, (1+n) (l+o»l+r
(n-r)B ( 1) ( ) 2 l+n = w-c l+r - c
B 1
(l+n)k = 1+n + w - c
r = f' (k)
w = f(k)-kf'(k)
The stationary competitive consumption possibility locus with bequests
is drawn in .Figure 4. OA2A1 is the no bequest locus. At capital-labor
ratios so high that (l+n)(l+o) > l+f'(k), B=O and the no-bequest locus
is again the relevant one. This critical capital-labor ratio, k is at A2•
Since 0 > 0, k ~k*, the golden rule capital-labor ratio. Considering
equations III.32c and III.32d, we can draw a consumption possibility
locus for each value of B. A higher value of B shifts the locus down- Z8 -
and to the right at a rate -(l+n). Thus all steady_state equilibria
with interior (positive) solutions for bequests lie on the line segment
AZA3A4~ All interior bequest solutions have the same capital-labor ratio,
defined by f'(k) = (l+n)(l+o) which is below the golden rule capital-labor
ratio. One such interior solution for bequests is drawn at A3 , where an
indifference curve is tangent to a budget constraint with slope -(l+f'(k»
on the line segment AZA3A4• The stationary consumption possibility locus
for the appropriate positive value of B is represented by the dashed curve
through A3• The complete stationary locus with bequests is given by the
no-bequest locus above AZ and the line segment AZA3A4• If the stationary
competitive equilibrium is on AlAZ' i.e., if there is a corner solution
for bequests, the effect of government lending and borrowing is as in the
no-bequest model. If the model is stable, the introduction of government
borrowing (d > 0) will reduce the equilibrium capital labor-ratio, while
the introduction of government lending (d < 0) will increase it. However,
government borrowing can never reduce the capital-labor ratio below k.
Once k falls to k, any further increase in government borrowing (which
represents an involuntary redistribution of income from the young to
the old) will be matched by exactly offsetting bequests, voluntary
transfers from the old to the young. This is most easily appreciated
if we consider the effect of government lending. Start from an initial
equilibrium, without government lending, with positive bequests as at
A3• With bequests, bonds and taxes the private budget constraint
111.Z9 and the capital market equilibrium condition 111.30 are replaced
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An interior solution with bequests.- 29 -
IlL29 '
Bt_l(l+rt+l )
+ (w - I 2 Bt l+n ct - Tt)(l+rt+l ) - c t t
I B
IlL30 ' t-l
d + kt+l(l+n) wt - c - Tt
+--= t l+n
We also have the budget constraint.
IlLl7 ' (r -n)d = T (l+n)
t t
The stationary constraints are:




IlL33b l~ (B-d(l+r» + w_cl k(l+n)
If, with d=O, a stationary solution obtains with B=Bo > 0, a negative
value of d=do will still permit the same consumption-capital stock equili-
brium to obtain as long as BO > I dO(I+r)I , i.e., as long as bequests can
be reduced by an amount equal, in present value, to the amount of
government lending. Then the involuntary government redistribution from
the old to the young will be neutralized as regards its effect on the life-
time resources of the two generations alive at anyone moment, by the
reduction in voluntary private redistribution from the old to the young.
Given any initial value of bequests, however, there always exists a
volume of government lending large enough to put private agents in a
zero-bequest corner. Thus, with bequests, the government can always
raise the capital-labor ratio above k. It can never bring it down
below k.- 30 -
Gifts from the Young to the Old
With gifts from the young to the old, the utility function is
W t = V(c~,C~,W~_I). W~~l is the maximum level of utility attained by
a member of generation t-l. We again adopt the additively separable
form:
We note that unlike standard time discounting, the utility of a member of
the earlier generation is not compounded, but discounted. Convergence
requires .that the discount rate applied to parents' utility be positive,
p > O. Gifts of course cannot be negative. Gt~. The behavior of the








wt-Ct - Gt = kt+l(l+n)
and, as before r t = f'(k
t
)
wt = f(kt ) - k~:f'(kt)
The private budget constraint allows for gifts handed out and received. The
capital mark~t equilibrium condition reflects the fact that resources giy~n b3
the young to the old, who do not save, are no longer available for capital
formation.- 31 -
The first order conditions of the private optimization problem are:
IlL37a
III.37b
If Gt > 0, i.e., if there is an interi~r solution for gifts, III.37b
holds with equality. If there is a corner solution for gifts, i.e., if
G=O is a binding constraint, III37b holds with strict inequality.
Equation III.37a is the condition for the optimal allocation of consump-
tion for a member of generation t between the two periods of his life.
III.37b states that if gifts are given from generation t to gener-
ation t-l, the marginal utility of own consumption should equal the
marginal utility of gifts. The marginal utility of gifts is then
expressed in terms of the marginal utility of own consumption of a
member of generation t-l. This marginal utility of own consumption of
generation t-l is discounted at the generational discount factor (l+p).
Second-period consumption of members of generation t-l takes place one
period before second-period consumption of members of generation t,
so interest is foregune and further discounting by (l+rt+l) is required.
Finally, there are more members of generation t than of generation t-I. .A
member of generation t-l therefore receives Gt(l+n) for Gt given up by a
member of generation t. If the marginal utility of own consumption exceeds
the marginal utility of gifts, Gt=O.- 32 -








G > Oimplies that III.38b holds with equality. A corner solution
with G=O binding implies that III.38b holds with strict inequality.
S~ationary equilibrium is given by:
III.38c G(r-n) = (w_cl ) (l+r)
III.38dk(1+n) + G = w _ c1
r = f' (k)
w = f(k)-kf'(k)
The interesting equation is III.38b. Since p is positive, G > 0 implies
r < n. An interior solution for gifts implies that the economy is dynami-
cally inefficient, at a capital-labor ratio ~ above the golden rule
capital-labor ratio k*. In models with inifite-lived households with a
constant pure rate of time preference 0, such an inefficiency can never
arise. Steady state equilibrium is characterized by (l+n)(l+O) = l+r.
With 0 > 0 this implies r > n. Earlier consumption is cet. par. valued
more than later consumption. This is not true when we have a child-parent
gift motive. Own earlier consumption may well be valued more than own
later consumption. The pure rate of time preference for own consumption,
O(c) = ul(c,c) -1,. may well be positive. Earlier consumption by parents,
u2(c,c)
however, is cet. par. valued less than later consumption by oneself.
Parental utilityis discounted, even though it "accrues" earlier. Thus
child-parent gifts do not make a private decentralized economy with- 33 -
finite-lived agents equivalent to an economy with infinite-lived agents.
It also does not rule out the possibility of dynamic inefficiency through
overaccumulation. Quite the contrary, if gifts are positive in the steady
state, the steady state is necessarily inefficient. An operative gift
motive is indeed a reflection of a very strong desire to shift resources
away from early consumption towards later consumption.
The effect of gifts on the steady state consumption possibility locus
is indicated in Figure 5. OA2Al is the locus without gifts. For capital-
'labor ratios below i, defined by f'(i) = l+n, the locus with gifts is
Hp
identical with the locus without gifts because the equilibrium solution
for G is zero. The stationary capital-labor ratio can never be above i
when there is a gift motive. All solutions with G > 0 lie on the line segment
A4 A3 A2 with slope -(l+n). Starting at A2 where G=O and k=i, an increase
in G shifts the stationary consumption possibility locus up and to the left
at a rate -(l+n). A typical interior solution for G is drawn at A3• An
indifference curve is tangent to a budget constraint with slope -(l+f'(i»
on the line segment A4 A3 A2• The stationary consumption possibility locus
for the appropriate positive value of G is represented by the dashed curve
through A3• The entire stationary consumption possibility locus with
gifts is given by the segment of the no-gift locus 0 A2 and the straight- 34 -
The effect of government borrowing and lending in the presence of
a gift motive is easily analyzed. As long as the economy stays in the
range of capital-labor ratios below i, government lending and borrowing
will have the same effect as in the model without gifts and bequests.
If k=~ initially (with d=O), government lending (d < 0) will not have any
effect on the steady-state consumption path and capital-labor ratio.
Involuntary government redistribution from the old to the young will be
neutralized immediately by matching voluntary gifts from the young to the
old. Government borrowing, d > 0, will also be neutralized by matching
reductions in gifts from the young to the old, up to the point that the
constraint G > 0 becomes binding. The private budget constraint, capital
market equilibrium condition and government budget constraint with gifts,
borrowing and taxes are
and
I
Wt-Lt - ct - Gt = d + kt+l(l+n)
(rt-n) d = Lt(l+n)
The stationary equations are:
III.39a
2 - c = 0
III.39b G + d~~r) + k(l+n) = w _ cl
Equations III.39a and III.39b show that G and d(l+r) are "perfect substi-
l+n
tutes" as long as the constraint G > 0 is not violated. Thus as long as,
with d=O, the initial G, (Go, say) is larger than dO(I+r), where dO is
l+n-34(a)-
Figure 5
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An interior solution for child-parent gifts.- 35 -
the size of the real per capita government bond issue, the private sector
can and will undo the effects of the government action on consumption and
the capital-labor ratio by reducing voluntary gifts from the young to the
old. For any initial G, however, there always exists a government borrow-
ing program large enough to make G > 0 a binding constraint. Such actions
will move the economy from A4 A3 AZ onto AZ 0, lowering the capital-labor
ratio. In view of the inefficiency of the private, decentralized compe-
titive solution with positive gifts, such borrowing will ~lways constitute a
Pareto improvement as long as it does not lower k below k*.
Gifts and bequests
I now consider the case of "two-sided caring". Each generation cares
about the welfare of its immediate ancestors and its immediate descendants.
The utility function is:
1 Z * * W t = v(ct,Ct ' W t _l , Wt+l)o
The special case of the additively separable function is again .considered:
1 Z -1 * -1 * W t = u(ct'Ct ) + (1+0) W t+l + (l+p) Wt_lo
Convergence now requires not only <5 > 0 and p > 0 but <5p > 1.
It might be thought that the solution to the problem with both gifts
and bequests is in some way a simple combination of the solutions to the
cases with just gifts and just bequests. This is not so. With "one-sided
caring" (either gift or bequest motives but not both) the private agent's
optimization problem is a standard problem in dynamic programming. With
a bequest motiv~ each agent in generation t cares potentially for all his- 36 -
descendants. Directly as regards his immediate heir, indirectly through
the dependence of the utility of his immediate descendant on the utility
of generation t+2, etc. In the same way, with a gift motive, each agent
potentially cares for all his ancestors. In either case utility chains
stretch out in one direction only. With both gift and bequest motives,
this unidirectional simplicity no longer applies. An agent in generation
t cares directly about generations t-l and t+l. These generations both
care directly about generation t. Generation t~l also cares directly
about t-2 and generation t+l about t+2. Immediately, utility chains can
be seen to be running in both directions. These issues were discussed
for the first time in Carmichael (1979). A particularly simple solution
emerges when the following assumptions are made about the "game" played
by a member of generation t with past and future generations:
1. A member of generation t acts competitively inhis labor and
capital markets, i.e. he takes wt and r t+l as parametric. He also assumes
that all past and future generations have acted or will act competitively
in their factor markets.
2. A member of generation t, in formulating his consumption gift-
bequest plan, knows the utility levels and actions of all past generations and
correctly anticipates utility levels and actions of all future generations
(rational expectations or perfect foresight).
3. A member of generation t plays a non-cooperative gift and bequest
game with past and future generations. He rationally believes that all past
and future generations play the same game. This strategy is closed-loop as- 36a -
regards "the utility and actions of the two generations with which he overlaps
(generations t-1 and t+1). This means that when evaluating the alternative
actions open to him at the beginning of period t, he believes that he can
affect the total utility and the actions of his immediate descendants and his
immediate forebears.
His stre.tegy is open-loop as regards the utility and actions of all other
generations (t-i, i~2 and t+j, j~2). Thus, when evaluating the effects of
marginal changes in his actions, he ignores the impact on the actions and
utility of generations that are already dead when he is born or that are born
after his 1ifetime.9/
4. When formulating his closed-loop strategy vis-a-vis generations t-1
and t+1, he believes that he can alter the behavior_of these generations (i.e.
their consumption, gift and bequest choices) only by altering the total resources
available to them, i.e., only through direct transfers.
5. Each generations acts so as to maximize its utility.
6. Each generation views the w"or1d and plays the game in the same way as
the member of generation t just described.
The resulting equilibrium in this differentialgame is a Nash equilibrium.- 37 -
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Bt _l 1 2
111.41 Bt - Gt+l (l+n) ~ (l+n - Gt}(l+rt+l ) + (wt-ct)(l+rt+l ) - ct
Bt,Gt'C~'c~ ~ 0
economy-wide constraints:
111.42 wt - c~ + Bl~ - Gt = kt+l(l+n)
r t +l = f' (kt+l )
wt


















If Bt > 0, III.43b holds with strict equality. If Bt=O is a binding





> 0, III.43c holds with strict equality. If Gt=O is a binding
constraint, III.43c holds with strict inequality. Using assumptions (1)
through (6), the first order conditions and the private budget constraints
of current, past and future generations, we can express generation t's marginal
utility from bequests in terms of the marginal utility of own consumption of
generation t+l.- 38 -
aw* * (l+p) (1+rt+2) aWt+1 III.44 t --= [(l+p) (1+0)-1] (1+n) 2 aBt aCt+1





[(l+p) (1+0)-1] (1+il) 2 a 2 aCt+1 ct
If Bt > 0, then 111.45 holds with strict equality. If Bt=O is a
binding constraint, 111.45 holds with strict inequality.
In an exactly analogous manner we can express generation tIs
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111.46 and III.43c and ?sing III.43a, we obtain:
III.47
* (1+n) (1+0) aWt _1




If Gt > 0, then 111.47 holds with strict equality. If Gt = 0
is a binding constraint, 111.47 holds with strict inequality.
The steady state conditions are:
( 1 2) ( ) (. 1 2)10/ III.48a u1 c ,c = l+r. u2 c ,c .--
III.48b l+r:S: [(l+p) (1+0)-1] (1+n) .-. fS-L -70
l+p ) (\ G::.O "'-) D) I') "1, J )
If B > 0 then III.48b holds with equality. If B = 0 is a binding




If G > 0 then III.48c holds with equality. If G = 0 is a binding
constraint then III.48c holds with strict inequality.III.48d
- 39 -






B 1 = l+n - G + w - c .
r = f'(k)
w = f(k)-kf'(k)
With n, p and 0 strictly positive, III.48b and III.48c cannot both
hold with equality. This is the commonsense result that there will not be
both gifts and bequests in the steady state. Thus, if B > 0, then G= 0,
and if G > 0 then B = O. However, it is possible for III.48b and III.48c
to both hold with strict inequality, Le., for both gifts and bequests to
be zero.
Note that if III.48b holds with equality, Le., if there is an
interior solution for bequests, we have r > n: the capital-labor ratio
is below the golden rule capital-labor ratio. 11/ Also, if III.48c holds
with equality, i.e., if there is an interior solution with gifts, we have
r < n: the ~apital-labor ratio is above its golden level. Figure 6
illustrates the stationary consumption possibility locus when there is
both a bequest and a gift motive. For capital labor ratios below that
defined by (l+f'(k» = (l+o)(l+n) but above that defined by (l+f'(k»
(l+p)(1+0)-1
[(l+p )(l+cS)-l](l+n) , the stationary consumption possibility locus is the
l+p
same as it is without gifts and bequests. On the curve segment A2 AS'
there are corner solutions for gifts and bequests: G = B = O. When there
is an interior solution for gifts the equilibrium is on the line segment
Al A2 with slope -(l+n). A2 is defined by-(l+f'(k» = (l+cS)(l+n)
l-(l+p)(l+cS)
As- 40 -
in the gifts only case, larger positive values of G shift the locus up
and to the left at a rate -(l+n). Note that the degree of overaccumu1ation
relative to the golden rule is less when G > 0, if there is both a gift and
a bequest motive than if there only is a gift motive.121 The tende~cyto
"oversave", represented by the gift motive is partly, but not completely,
neutralized by the presence of a bequest motive. A3 A4 would be the locus
of interior soutions for G if there were only a gift motive. If the bequest
motive is operative, i.e., if B > 0, all stationary solutions lie on the
line segment AS A6 with slope -(l+n). AS is defined by (l+f'(k» =
[(l+p)(l+o)-l] (l+n). As in the case of bequests only, larger positive
l+p
values of B shift the locus down and to the right at a rate -(l+n).
A7 AS would be the locus of interior solutions for B if there were just
a bequest motive. The degree of underaccumu1ation, relative to the
golden ru1e,is less if there is both a bequest and a gift motive than if
h 0 1 Of ° 13/ t ere ~s on y a g~ t mot~ve.---
The effects of government lending and borrowing on the steady-state
capital-labor ratio are a straightforward combination of the effects of
such policies when there was either a gift or a bequest motive but not both.
Consider an initial equilibrium without government debt: d = O. If
the initial equilibrium is in the range of k for which there is a corner
solution for both Band G, i.e., on A2 AS' government borrowing (d > 0)
cannot lower k below the value defined by l+f'(k) = [(l+p)(l+o)-l] (l+n)
l+p
nOr can government lending (d < 0) raise k above the value defined by
l+f'(k) = (l+o)(l+n)
(l+p)(l+o)-l
If there is an interior solution for gifts, on-40(a)-
Figure 6
= -(1 + f' (k*»)
O](l+U)
slope -(1 + n)
slope: [1 - (1 + s=' ) (l +
1 + SO
slope - (1 + n)
slope'(l + 0 ) (1+ 'n)
1 - (1 +<5 )(1' +0)
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Stationary consumption possibility loci, without gifts and bequests,
with either gifts or bequests and with both gifts and bequests.-41-
Al A2, government borrowing will be offset by a reduction in gifts of
equal present value, thus leaving c1,c2 and k unchanged, unless the
increase in d is larger, in present value, than the original value of G.
In other words, there is always a positive value of d large enough to make
G ? 0 a binding constraint. If there is an interior solution for bequests, on
AS A6' government lending (d<O) will be offset by a reduction in bequests
of equal present value which leaves c1, c2 and k unchanged. Again, if the
value of lending is larger, in present value, than the original bequest,
the constraint B ? 0 will become binding.
With gifts, bequests, borrowing and taxes the private and public sector
d + kt+l (l+n).
1 w - c - L , t.,. t t III.49b
budget constraints and the capital market equilibrium conditions are:
Bt_l(l+rt+l ) 1 2





+ l+n - Gt =
The stationary equations are:
III.SOa (n-r)[~ - G _ d(l+r)]
l+n l+n
III.SOb B G _ d(l+r) = k(l+n) _ w + cl
1+n - l+n
We knp~ _ that if B>O,then G = 0 and if G > 0 then B = O. Thus if
B > 0, a reduction in d by an amount ~d will be neutralized by a reduction
in B by the amount ~d(l+r), as long as this does not violate the constraint
B > O. If G > 0, an increase in d by an amount ~d will be neutralized by




The policy conclusions of this theoretical investigation of debt neu-
trality are straightforward. While operative intergenerational gift and
bequest motives turn finite-lived households into infinite-lived households
in a certain sense, there remain essential differences. In particular,
if the child-parent gift motive is operative, the decentralized, competi-
tive equilibrium is socially inefficient because it is characterized by
a capital-Iab?r ratio above the golden rule. There is therefore a prima
facie case for government intervention in the saving-investment process•
..
The second conclusion concerns debt neutrality .II~re.ey€:ry neutrali.t.x:._
-
theorem is matched by a non-neutrality theqr~m~ If neither bequests nor
gifts are operative, goverment borrowing crowds out capital formation. If
child-parent gifts are operative, small increases in government borrowing
are neutralized by reductions in gifts. If bequests are operative, small
reductions in government borrowing (or increases in lending) are neutralized
by reductions in bequests. There always exists an increase in lending or
borrowing that will make B=O, respectively G=O a binding constraint. There always
is a government financial strategy that puts the private sector in a zero
gift and zero bequest corner solution, where financial policy will affect.
the capital-labor ratio. -tn··our simple model, all agents are identical,
so either everyone is at a corner or no one is. If instead we visualize
... -
a distribution of agents, by 0, by p, and by the other p~rameters of their
utility functions and the constraints they face, inc~ea~~ng government bor-
rowing can be expected to make the zero gift constraint binding for an
increasing number of agents.-43-
Even in this most classical of models, the conclusion emerges inexor-
ably that the way in which the government finances its real spending program
will have major consequences for saving and capital formation. Debt neutrality
is not a plausibl~.!=~~?!.eti~~~ .propositi()n. Future re.~~ar.cp. shguld cC?ncentrate
on empirical assessments of the extent and nature of non-neutrality.
b. Monetary Superneutrality in a Fully Optimizing Macromodel
The overlappin~generations model is also a convenient vehicle for
analyzing the issue of superneutrality of money in an explictly optimizing
and fully rational model. Superneutrality is the invariance of the trajec-
tories of the real variables of the economy under different proportional
rates of growth of the nominal money stock. Money is defined as a non-
interest-bearing (nominally denominated) liability of the government that
has no "intrinsic value" in the sense that it is neither used as a consump-
tion good, nor as an input in the productive process. The two functions
performed by this financial~laimare the medium of exchange function and
the store of value functio~ Carmichael (1979) devel~~s a model in which
both functions are incorporated. For simplicity, I shall limit the analysis
to a consideration of the store of value function of money. The anti-
superneutrality result obtained in the simpler model carries over to the
"~?re complex model considered by Carmichael. Consider the introduction of
money in a""si?ple overlapping generations model without gifts, bequests or
interest-bearing government debt, in which the only other store of value
is real reproducible capital. Since money balances are not desired for
their own sake but only for their purchasing power over real output, the
real rate of return on money balances is the negative of the expected
proportional rate of change of the price level -lip/p. In the certainty-44-
model under consideration, the actual and expected rates of inflation
are the same, if expectations are rational. ~ =~. Also, money and
p p
real capital are perfect substitutes as stores of value. They will only
both be held if their rates of return are equal. If the rate of return
on money balances were below that on real capital, -~ < f'(k), no money
p
would be held, if the rate of return on money balances were above that
on real capital, -~ > f'(k), no capital would be held. Considering only
p
those trajectories on which both assets are held, we l.ave: 14/
111.51 -~ = f'(k)
p
Let ~ denote the proportional rate of growth of the nominal money supply:
~ = lIM/M. Mis the nominal stock of money. In steady-state equilibrium,
the rate of change of the price level is the rate of growth of the money
supply minus the natural rate of growth of the economy:
III.~~ 1+~ = 1+~ or, approximately, ~ ~ ~-n. Equations 111.51
p l+n . _.._ ...... _. p . .. _. _
and III.52 are sufficient to__r~f.~t~_ tJ:H~._sup'e~l1eutra1i ty_ proposition. .Since-
n-~ f'(k),an increase in the rate of growth of the money supply will
lower the ~teady-state rate of return on money balances by raising the
steady-state rate of inflation. Portfolio balance requires an equal
reduction in the rate of return on capital. This is accomplished by a
higher capital-labor ratio. Models such-as ~Si~]='i~_~.ld's(:1,967) Y?h:i-ch. exhibit..-
invariance of steady-state k under different va1~es for ~ are only super-
ficia11y rational, optimizing models. By including real money balances as
an argument in the direct utility function, on a par with consumption and
leisure, the Sid~~u~~~ model violates the principle that money is only
wanted for what it can buy. It is therefore not an interesting framework
for analysing monetary policy.-45-
The overlapping generations model with money is summarized in 111.53.
Money is introduced into the economy via lump-sum transfers. There is no
relation between the stock of money held by an economic agent and the size of
the transfer. If there were, the monetary injections would be akin to pay-
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w_cl = k(l+n) + m
1 + ~ = (l+n) (1 +~) [since by assumption m > 0]
p
r = f' (k)
III.54g w = f(k) - kf'(k)-46-
Equations III.54c, e, and f produce the anti-superneutrality result that
(l+P) = (l+n)(l-f' (k)).
The conclusion that "equilibrium" and "rationality" do not imply "neutrality"
again emerges forcefully, as it did when debt neutrality was considered. The
detailed consideration of the fully rational, optimizing models of this section
also leads to the conclusion that the ad hoc model of Section II is in many
ways an acceptable parable for the "purer" ~odels of Section III.
IV. Stabilization Policy in Stochastic Non-Walrasian Models
A Walrasian economy has two essential features. The first is the existence
of a comp1eteset of contingent forward markets. This permits the interpreta-
tion of such an economy as a "one shot," static economy. At the beginning of
time, t = t , equilibrium prices are established for the current and contingent o . - ..
future delivery of all goods·-and.services. The rest of history then consists
solely of the unfolding execution of the contingent forward contracts established
at the initial market date. The second essential feature is that prices are
competitive, market-clearing prices. This means that at the prevailing set of
market prices demand does not exceed supply for any good, when these demands
- . -
and supplies represent notional plans. Households' notional demands and suppl_:!:e.§.. __.
are derived from utility maximization subject only to the constraint of the house-
holds'end<?W1?ents e'vaiuatedat parametric market prices. Firms' notional"demands-ancr-
supplies are derived from profit maximization subject only to the constraint of
the production possibility set, with all planned sales and purchases evaluated
at parametric market prices. All economic agents act as if, at the prevailing
market prices, they can buy or sell any amount of any good or service. The
demands and supplies derived under these conditions are consistent.-47-
A non-Walrasian economy, by contrast, is a sequence economy--one in which
transactions take place at different dates (see Hahn[1973]). Prices for all
contingent future goods and services are not established once-and-for-all,
in some initial market period. Markets are incomplete and "reopen," either
continuously or at discrete intervals. The overlapping generations model of
Section III is therefore, according to this definition, a non-Walrasian economy.
Forward contracts between those living today and the unborn are not feasible.
Markets are therefore incomplete. The factor markets that do exist reopen
each period. In models with uncertainty and imperfect, asymmetric information
other "natural" reasons can be found for the nonexistence of certain markets,
such as moral hazard and adverse selection. The overlapping generations model
maintains the second of the two essential Walrasian features. The incomplete set
of markets is always in momentary competitive general equilibrium. No 'potential
buyer or seller is rationed in any market or needs to consider any information
other than the known set of parametric market prices and his endowment or
technology set.
In this section, I shall briefly review some of the issues surrounding
stabilization policy in sequence economies when information.is incomplete and
when market prices are not automatically and instantaneously established at
the values that balance notional demands and supplies. For simplicity I shall
limit the analysis to the consideration of monetary policy. All sources of
monetary non-neutrality considered in Sections II and III are suppressed. This
includes effects on capital formation via the real rate of return on money and
wealth effects due to the presence of nominally denominated interest-bearing
public debt.-48-
Sticky nominal prices and real effects of deterministic monetary
feedback rules
It is well-known that if a market is inefficient, in the sense that the
market price does not fully reflect all available information, pure nominal
shocks and disturbances, including anticipated changes in the money stock,
will have real effects. The simple textbook IS-LMmode1 with its exogenously
fixed money wage and money price level is the best-known example. With the
general price level given exogenously, an increase in the nominal stock of
money represents an equal proportional increase in the real stock of money
balances. By lowering the inter~st rate and/or via the Pigou effect this
will alter real effective demand. It may seem plausible to locate such inef-
ficiences primarily in the goods and factor markets, while treating the
financial markets as efficient, with financial asset prices or rates of return
always adjusting instantaneously to new information about current or anticipated
future events, so as to maintain equilibrium between demand and supply.
-
someof the recent work by Stiglitz on non-market-c1earing equilibria and
Interestingly,
the micro-foundations of price and wage-stickiness dealt with financial markets
(Stig1itz[1979]). Imperfect, costly and asymmetric information characterize
personal and corporate credit markets and insurance markets as much as the
labor market, the housing market or the market in second-hand cars. Work on
this subject by Arker10f [1970], Stiglitz [1979], Grossman [1976], Salop [1978],
Wilson [1979] and others shows how privately rational, optimizing behavior can
result in socially inefficient, quantity-constrained equilibria in which market
prices are "sticky" in the sense that they do not always respond to the existence of
excess demand or supply. The simple linear stochastic model described below
imposes price rigidity, without explicitly deriving it, as Stiglitz has done,
as the [momentary] eaui1ibrium outcome of a process generated by optimizing-49-
economic agents. It is therefore ad hoc. The assumption of instantaneous
and continuous competitive equilibrium, however, is equally ad hoc unless the
process is specified through which this miracle of coordination is achieved.
It is not enough to assert that all feasible trades that are to the perceived
mutual advantage of the exchanging parties must be exhausted. What :needs to
be explained is how the price vector always assumes a value that renders
feasible, in the aggregate, actions that appear feasible at the micro-level when
each agent acts competitively. The micro-foundations of competitive market
clearing are not yet well developed. Essential ingredients are large numbers
of potential buyers and sellers, specialized middlemen or brokers, easy
identification of the relevant economic characteristics of the commodity in
question and other fundamental components of market structure such as the laws,
rules and regulations governing the exchange of property rights over the
commodity.
The ad hoc linear stochastic disequilibrium model is described in
equations IV.l - IV~6.
* - Y ) '" 0.>0 IV.l P = o.(Y + Pt-l,t t t t
IV.2 Pt-Pt-l = s(p~ - Pt-l) O:SS:Sl
IV.3 A y(m - p )+ d y>O = e:t t t t
IV.4 Y At t
IV.5 Yt Y+ s = e:t
IV.6 +
0 xt = Pt e:t
P~ is the equilibrium price in period t, Pt the actual price in period t,
P the price anticipated, in t-l, to prevail in period t; At is effective
t-l,t-50-




£ and £ are white noise disturbances. All variables are in logs.
t t
Equation IV.1 is a version of the "Lucas supply function." Deviations of out-
put from its natural level are possible if and only if the equilibrium price
level is different from the price level expected, last period, to prevail this
period. Equation IV.2 models sluggish adjustment of the actual price level to
the equilibrium price level. Only if 8=1, i.e., only if adjustment is instan-
taneous, do we have the strict "surprise supply function" according to which
the only source of departures of actual output from its natural level is a
price forecast error.l&/ Equation IV.3 models effective demand as an increasing
function of the stock of real money balances and a white noise demand dis-
turbance. Equation IV.5 models capacity output as a constant plus a random
supply disturbance. Equation IV.6 asserts that the current price level is
not observable. Instead, private agents observe xt ' which is the true price
level plus a white noise disturbance, ~~.
If expectations are rational, i.e., if they are minimum mean squared error
forecasts, if economic agents know the true structure of the model (the values
of a, 8, Y and Y),if they know that the_disturbances are mutually and serially
independent and identically distributed random variables with zero means and
if they observe x
t
at time t, the rational expectation of the price level is
easily found to be:
IV.6 E (Ptl~t-1) = a8)'
E (mtl~t-1) -
a8 -'- (1-8) y+ x
t
_





a8 Y + (1-8) + (1-8) 0 = 1-8+a8y 1-8+a8y 1-8+a8y Pt-1 1-8+a8Y £ t-1-51-
Here E represents the mathematical expectation operator and ~ denotes the
t
private information set, written as a vector, available at time t, conditional
on which private expectations are formed. Note that because of the inertia in
the price adjustment process, the past price level directly carries informa-
tion about the current price level via the last" term of IV.6 as well a~
possibly indirectly via E(m I ~ .1). When price adjustment is instantaneous,
t t-






The reduced form equations for the price level and real output are given in
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u The effect of an unanticipated increase in the money supply, ~m , is given by:
IV.9b
Two propositions emerge. First, as long as the price level is not completely
inflexible (13)0), an unanticipated increase in the money supply will have a
larger effect on real output than an anticipated increase in the money supply.17/-52-
Second, only if the price level is perfectly flexible (8=1), will anticipated
money supply changes have no effect on real output. Even then, unanticipated
monetary disturbances will continue to have real effects.
Except for the recent papers by Stiglitz et al. most of the theoretical
work on wage and price rigidity can be characterized as [implicit] contract
theory (Azariadis [1975], Baily [1974], Grossman [1978], Fischer [1977],
Phelps and Taylor [1977]). Multi-period employment contracts are viewed as
mutually privately rational arrangements for shifting risk from risk-averse
workers to risk-neutral or less risk-averse capitalists. Similarly, multi-
period price contracts between well established suppliers and customers can be
viewed as transactions and search cost minimizing as well as risk-sharing arrange-
ments (Okun [1975]). What is not clear is why optimal multi-period contracts
would set (i.e., predetermine) nominal wages or prices, thus assigning the role
of shock absorbers solely to quantities (employment and sales) (Barro [1979]).
A recent attempt to overcome some of the shortcomings of contract theory was made by
Hall [1979], who rationalizes wage and price stickiness by developing a theory
of the role of "prevailing prices and wages" in the efficient organization of
markets.
If prices can adjust to clear markets with the same frequency with which
new information accrues and with the same speed with which the monetary
authority can respond to any new information, monetary policy will enter the
ex> i
reduced form for real output only via a term like i~o w (mt _i - E(mt _i _l $t-i-l)),
i.e., via a series of one-period ahead forecast errors. With multi-period
nominal contracts monetary policy will enter the reduced form for real output
ex>
via a term like .L
J=o .E wi(m .-E(mt . 1$ .. 1))' i.e., via a sequence of
1=0 t-J -J t-J-1-
forecast errors for mt . from different dates in the past. Thus, if money wages
-J-53-
and prices are determined by a series of overlapping multi-period nominal
contracts and if the nominal money stock can be adjusted freely each period,
the information set available at the time of the current money supply decision
will in general be larger than the information sets that were available when most of
the currently prevailing money prices and wages were contracted for. The
public sector does not have an informational advantage over the private sector
at any moment of time, but only the public agent is able to change his control--
the money supply--in response to any new information. Private agents are
"locked in" by past nominal contracts. Given this differential ability to
respond to new information, monetary policy can be used to stabilize (or
destabilize) real output.
Differential information between the private
and public sectors
Equations IV.8 and IV.9 make it clear that sluggishness in the adjustment
of prices can be a sufficient reason for anticipated money supply changes to
have real effects. Asymmetric information between the private sector and
. .-
the monetary authorities can be another reason for effective monetaryp~l~cy, gy~n
if the price level is market-clearing (Barro[1976]). It is not necessary for
the public sector to have uniformly superior.information. All that is required
is that different agents have differential access to (and ability to process
and assimilate) different kinds of information. Let W be the information
t
set of the monetary authority in period t. mt will be some function, Tt , of
For simplicity T
t
is taken to be linear.
IV.olO m = T W t t t
Consider the equilibrium version of IV.8, where 8=1.
IV.8'
Substituting IV.IO into IV.8' gives-54-
IV.ll
The response of real output to monetary policy in the equilibrium model
depends on the monetary policy rule, T , on the monetary authority's informa-
t .
tion set $t and on the private sector's information set $t-l' as well as ~n the
structural parameters ~ and y. In period t-l, the private sector must fore-
cast the value of the money supply in period t. To do so it must know, or
predict, both the policy rule, Tt and the public sector's information set $t·
If the policy rule next period is known, and if the public and private sector
information sets are identical, $t = $t' the problem is easily solved. The
real effect of monetary policy will be an increasing function of Tt$t -E(Tt<Ptl<p~_l)·
This expression will be orthogonal to (independent of) 't_l~The con-
ditional distribution function of Yt , given 't-l' is therefore independent
of the policy function Tt as long as this function is known and the infor-
mation sets of the private sector and the monetary authorities coincide.
If the policy rule is known but if the private information set and the
public sector information set are not identical (and if the latter is not
to ~ (or ,I. ) The conditional distribution function of Yt will 'l't-l 'l't-l •
therefore not be independent of the known policy rule Tt • If the policy
rule, Tt is not known to the private sector the conditional distribution
function of Yt is of course not independent of Tt , even if the public
and private information sets "'t and 't are otherwise the same. Important
and unsettled issues arise when informational asymmetries occur. Can the
public sector communicate its "privileged" information to the private
sector? If so, are there lags and/or filtering problems as public sector
information is disseminated? Is it better to reveal privileged information
(assuming this is possible) than to usefthe informational advantage to
influence real private sector behavior?-55-
Changing the Structure of Private Sector Information
In a set of recent papers, Laurence Weiss [1979 a,b] has provided
another ingeneous argument for a role for active (feedback) monetary
policy in rational expectations models. This role exists even if the
information sets of the private and public sectors are identical. Let ~t
be the original private and public information set, expressed as a finite-
dimensional vector. Let 0t be the set of all information that could
be relevant. ~t is some subset of at. We will write it as a linear
transformation L of at:
~t = LOt·
We can, without loss of generality, assume L to be of full rank, although
it will not in general be a square matrix. Since the public sector does
not hold an informational advantage over the private sector, it cannot
add or create additional private information, i.e., it cannot change the
rank of the matrix L. It can, however, through feedback policy, change
the matrix L to a matrix L' that has the same rank but conveys information
that has a different economic impact. An example will illustrate this.
Consider a decentralized competitive economy with many separated markets.
In any given period a trader is randomly assigned to a given market.
His demand or supply decision will depend on the relationship between
the current price in his own market and the average price expected to
prevail in the next period when he will be reassigned randomly to another
market. All he observes in the current period is the price in his market.
There are two disturbances, an aggregate nominal disturbance common to
all markets, nt' and a market-specific real -dis~~rb~~~;, u~ in the ith-56-
market, i=l,•••• ,n. The trader in market i only observes some linear
combination of those two disturbances:
The L matrix of a trader in market i
is [Ai, 0,•••• , Ai,....O]' and has rank one. Only the relative, real
shock u~ matters to the ith trader. He will respond to nt because he
cannot filter out the separate contributions of nt and u~ to the single
observed disturbance At nt + A2 u~. Monetary feedback policy may be
capable of changing the information structure in such a way as to set
Ai equal to zero. The L matrix is [0,0••• , A~, ••••,O]" The relative,
real"shock can now be identified. No information is added on balance:
u~ has been identified at the expense of the loss of all information onnt "
Since the economic implications of observing u~ are different from those
of observing nt' this change in the structure of information can have
real consequences.
The Insufficiency of Prices in Sequence Economies With
Incomplete Markets and rational Expectations
There is an implication of the rational expectations approach that
seems to have been overlooked by its advocates. One of the major virtues
of a market system is supposed to be the role played by prices determined
in efficient markets as effective aggregators of information. Decentralized,
atomistic private agents need not worry about the myriad of other agents,
about their tastes, technologies and endowments. All information necessary
for the optimal planning of consumption, production and sales is contained
in current market prices that are parametric to the individual agent. If-57-
markets are incomplete and expectations of future spot prices replace cur-
rently available prices established in forward markets, rational expecta-
tions are a strong reminder of the insufficiency of the price mechanism
for efficient resource allocation. Rational expectations are optimal
forecasts based on the forecasting agent's knowledge of the true structure
of the economy. They require knowledge of the underlying structural para-
meters of public and private sector preferences, technologies and endowments.
The local, partial nature of the knowledge provided by prices in a real-
world market economy with incomplete markets, means that additional global,
economy-wide informational demands are made on private agents with rational
expectations. Such informational demands are often dismissed as unrealistic
when central planning is discussed. The informational requirements of
central planning are no different from the informational requirements of
"decentralized" rational expectations models of sequence economies with
incomplete markets.
v. Conclusion
The "New Classical Macroeconomics" has forced a thorough reval-
uation of the theoretical and empirical foundations of Neo-Keynesian
conventional wisdom. After the rhetoric ~s stripped away, how-
ever, the analytical implications of the New Classical Macroeconomics are
surprisingly familar to neo-Keynesians. Substitution of debt financing
for tax financing crowds out saving in the short run and lowers the capital-
labor ratio in the long run. A higher, fully anticipated rate of growth
of the money supply will not be super-neutral and is likely cet. par. to be-58-
associated with a higher steady state capital-labor ratio. Monetary feed-
back rules will alter the trajectories of real economic variables. This
confirmation of the importance of monetary, fiscal and financial policy
for the cyclical and the long-run behavior of the real economy is not neces-
sarily a source of comfort. After all, "policy neutrality" would be most
welcome when the conduct of policy is erratic, confusing or incompetent.
No such easy escape is available to the policy maker; policy can stabilize
and it can destabilize, it can promote growth and prosperity or destroy it.- 59 -
*This paper was written while I was with the the Financial Studies Division,
Research Department, International Monetary Fund. It was presented at the Eighth
Money Study Group Oxford Seminar, Brasenose College, Oxford, September 26-28, 1979.
I would like to thank George von Furstenberg for helpful comments.
FOOTNOTES
1/ Government capital formation is ignored for simplicity.
2/ Since labor supply and consumption decisions are jointly determined
by-the household's intertemporal utility maximization program, the consump-
tion function and labor supply function should have the same arguments.
Choosing the more standard (ad hoc) specifications of equations 11.3 and
11.13 does not affect the argument.
1/ Depreciation is ignored.
4/ This neutrality proposition can be interpreted in one of the two
following ways. (a) Compare the solution trajectories for two economies,
identical in all respects except that the nominal stock of money in country
2 M 2(t) exceeds that in country 1, Ml(t) by a fixed fraction: M 2(t) =
M1(t)(1+a), a > O~ for all t. In economy 2 the equilibrium solutions for
the price level p (t) and the money wage, w2(t), will ~xceed those in
c~untry 1, pl(tl and wl(t), by the same fraction a. p (t) = (l+a) pl(t);
w (t) = (l+a) w (t). All real variables are the same. (b) Consider the
solution trajectory of a given economy before and after an unanticipated
change in the money supply at t=T. Let the money supply up to T be Ml(t).
Until t=T, economic agents expect the money supply to follow Ml(t) inde-
fintely into the future. At T the actual and anticipated money supply
path becomes MZ(t) = Ml(t)(l+a), a > 0 for t ~ T. If there is this
unancipated chang2
at t = T in the money stock process, the price level
path after T is p (t) = (l+a)p!(t), t ~ T. Here p!(t) is the price level
path that would have prevailed at and beyond t=T, had no unanticipated
change in the money supply occurred at t=T.
5/ I abstract for simplicity from the wealth effect and real interest
rate effect on the labor supply.
6/ u is ~ssumed to be strictly quasiconcave and increasing in cl and
cZ~ ul(O,c ) = uz(cl,O) = +~, ul(~,c2) = uz(cl,~) = O.
I/ We also assume fICO) = + m; f'(m) = 0
8/ A solution will exist if cl and cZ are both normal goods and if
cl- does not increase when r t+l increases. It will be unique if the
utility function is homothetic. See Carmichael (1979).- 60 -
9/ TI1is is different from Carmichael (1979) who considers the case where
an-individual only ignores the impact of marginal changes in his actions on
generations that are already dead, i.e. Carmichael uses a closed-loop strategy
vis-a-vis all later generations. TI1e symmetry imposed in my specification
considerably simplifies _the--analys?-~-: -. -




11/ We use the condition po > 1, for the stationary utility function to be
bounded.
12/ We assume p to be the same in both cases.
13/ We assume 0 to be the same in both cases.
14/ Since f' (k) > 0, this means that ~>O is inconsistent with money being
held in equilibrium. p
15/ We already make the assumption (explicit in III.53c) that both money and
capital are held and that the private saver will get the same rate of return on
his saving, no matter how he divides it between money and real capital.
16/ Equation IV.2 is only reasonable in an economy without an inflationary or
deflationary trend. If there is a trend in the price level (but not in the rate
of inflation), IV.2 can be modified to:
(Pt-Pt-l) - (Pt-l-Pt-2) = B(p*t-Pt-l-(Pt-l-Pt-2»
17/ TI1is is not a general property of rational expectations models. Bailey
(1978) provides examples of anticipated fiscal policy having greater "bang per
buck" than unanticipated fiscal policy.
Since E[I ep -E(T ep I cf> ), cf> ]=0
t t -t t t-l,' t-l-61-
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